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1. Introduction
One of the widely held opinions about Japanese firms’ high performance suggests that Japanese employees,
organized in teams, are making improvements in their own jobs through quality circles or other initiatives such
as a suggestion system. These kaizen (continuous improvement) activities have been considered in the Western
industrial world as a principal factor in Japanese firms’ high product quality and productivity. This opinion was
surely diffused by Japanese authors such as Masaaki Imai (Imai, 1986), Yasuhiro Monden (Monden, 1985), and
strengthened by IMVP’s research synthesis (Womack, Roos, and Jones, 1990)1. Moreover the importance of
employees’ kaizen activities has also been emphasized by Japanese firms themselves when they are promoting
these activities in their transplants in USA and in Europe (see, for example, the “Foreword” to JHRA (1995),
written by a manager of Toyota Motor Manufacturing USA). Consequently, it is comprehensible that European
and American automobile producers have tried to set in place kaizen activities in order to assure high product
quality, and if possible, to increase their productivity, by involving workers in these activities2.
However, Parker and Slaughter (1988), after studying Japanese transplants and American plants, underlines
that kaizen is focused upon increase in productivity and imposed as such to workers. These authors then
characterize the Japanese style factory management as “management by stress”. If the workers were
continuously compelled to increase their productivity by kaizen, they would always be under a stress.
Furthermore, increase in productivity means for them a risk of loosing their job as far as their employment is not
guaranteed. This fear would have a reality in the countries where the labor market is flexible to such an extent
that workers and / or union present their hostility against the kaizen.
１ Of course, there existed firms such as Ford and Renault who were aware of the importance of kaizen activities carried by small
groups before the publication of these books. These early attempts did not however bring their fruits as expected, but constituted
learning process in planting small group activities in factories. See in this regard chapters 9 and 14 in Freyssenet, Mair, Shimizu and
Volpato (1998).
２ The reality of the so−called “Japanization” of factory management in the automobile industry is shown by the GERPISA
international network’s systematic studies, whose results are published in Freyssenet, Mair, Shimizu, Volpato (1998), Boyer,
Charron, Jürgens, Tolliday (1998), and Durand, Stewart and Castillo (1998).
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Discrepancy in understanding kaizen is then considerable. Does kaizen mainly target quality improvement or
productivity improvement? Without choosing a side, it is easy to show both have some truth, but lack a global
view of kaizen activities for highlighting one side. In order to seize the whole framework of kaizen, we have to
legitimately question whether these opinions confirm what it is that Japanese employees do in this regard in
their Japanese plants. First of all, who are these employees? They would have to be blue−collar workers in the
Western perception, but the part of their contribution in improving productivity and price cost does not seem
exceed 10% of all improvements obtained3. If it is not far from the reality, who then brings about the major
increase in these improvements? Second, are the kaizen activities carried out without having relation to the
company’s profit strategy? It is hard to imagine that completely voluntary activities give increasing productivity
leading to constantly reducing costs. If the employees have an objective in their kaizen activities, who provides
the objectives, what do these objectives consist of, and how are they managed? These questions invite us to
inquire about a whole management system of kaizen that exists in Japanese manufacturing companies. After
then, it will become easy to understand the reason why Japanese transplants emphasize the importance of
workers’ kaizen activities through small groups and / or a suggestion system.
Questioning however the kaizen management in this way ought to reach the diversity in practices because of
more or less firm specific management method. We can not say Japanese carmakers exercise the same
management, even though they all have quality circles and kaizen activities, but rather the difference in their
management seems to give the difference in their cost and productivity performance. So in this paper, I take the
case of Toyota as a representative example of kaizen management because it “had” the most systematic and
strongest cost management under which kaizen activities were organized. IMVP’s “Lean Production” (Womack,
Roos, and Jones, 1990) was modeled mainly based upon the Toyota Production System (TPS), but this
dimension of TPS has been neglected whereas it “constituted” the essential of TPS4. Why “had” and
“constituted”? This is because an institutional change in its cost management system occurred at the beginning
of 1990s.
For this reason, this text firstly presents the relationship between TPS and kaizen we can read through
representative English literature in order to show our problematic (Section 2), which calls for understanding of
Toyota’s cost management as its main framework of kaizen activities (Section 3). Our concerns will be
especially focused upon production efficiency management that is relevant to the organization of work and labor
cost reduction. Thirdly, it explains Toyota’s new production efficiency management after making clear the
problems of the old system arising in the phase of “bubble economy” (Section 4). And lastly, it shows new
kaizen activities oriented toward ergonomics by taking up the case of Tahara No.1 plant as an example (Section
３ This rate comes from a rough impression one of the managers at Toyota gave us. Eiji Ogawa (Ogawa, 1994 : p. 244) also shows
the same figure.
４ This dimension is neglected also by Spear and Bowen (1999), who consider the informal rules of kaizen activities as the DNA of
the TPS. But we have to say that there exist the formal rules of kaizen activities in question.
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5). Through these sections, I want to emphasize the importance of organized kaizen activities that group leaders,
chief leaders and engineers are carrying out, and also the fact that their activities are centered not only upon
productivity increases but also, and more significantly, upon the humanization of work after the modification of
the cost management system. In conclusion, I discuss the reason why Japanese transplants emphasize the
importance of workers’ kaizen activities through small groups and / or a suggestion system, and not that of
kaizen made by supervisory staff and engineers.
2. Kaizen in TPS
The famous TPS cannot be reduced to its organizational techniques of production such as “just−in−time” and
“Jidôka” (making machine tools and production lines autonomous, that is, they stop automatically when an
anomaly occurs). Its essence resides in the method of keeping up and reducing production costs as well as
improving product quality. This method is called “kaizen”.
In the literature that mentions kaizen are often emphasized small group activities such as quality circles and /
or suggestions made by individual workers. Wormack, Roos, and Jones (1990), which diffused the notion of
“Lean Production” through the industrial world, treats the kaizen carried out by quality circles as if all
improvement of assembly line was realized by quality circles organized by working team, surely though in
cooperation with shop engineers. In the bible of TPS (Ohno, 1978), which explains kaizen methods to increase
productivity and product quality, Taiichi Ohno does not talk about the management of kaizen activities. Monden
(1985) also have a tendency to reduce kaizen activities to those of quality circles.
On the contrary, Masaaki Imai and Paul Adler mention the kaizen carried out by supervisory staff and
engineers. Imai (1986), though generalizing the notion of kaizen, gives the fact that there exist three levels of
kaizen activities and a division of labor among them, i.e., kaizen made by shop managers and engineers, by
small groups such as quality circle, and by individual workers through a suggestion system. About NUMMI,
Adler (1998) also does not forget to note down the co−existence of bottom−up mechanisms and of top−down
mechanisms in kaizen. However, Imai as a consultant of kaizen is giving the priority of kaizen to the quality
improvement made by small groups and individual workers, though emphasizing a compatibility of quality
improvement and cost reduction (Imai, 1997). For him, increase in productivity must be the by−product of
quality improvement, which reduces repairing workers and time as well as makes “muda” (wastes of human
resource, materials and time) disappeared, so that he neglects kaizen directly aiming at increasing productivity
such as Parker and Slaughter (1988) shed light on. Adler (1998) also does not enter the top−down mechanisms
because NUMMI is giving the importance rather to the bottom−up process. However, if almost 50% of
supervisory staff’s tasks were spent for kaizen (Imai, 1986), and if nearly 90% of kaizen realized were come
from them and engineers, we should understand this top−down mechanism and their kaizen activities.
In this regard, Monden (1995) explains Toyota’s cost reduction management starting from “target costing” in
the product development phase and carrying through to “kaizen costing” in the production phase. As far as it
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concerns us, “kaizen costing” has to constitute the kaizen norm imposed upon employees, but he does not
explain kaizen activities organized under this “kaizen costing”. In this respect, only Japanese literature on
industrial relations is available : Masami Nomura (Nomura, 1993) makes clear the management of production
efficiency doing with a part of employees’ wage, which compels supervisory staff to engage themselves in
kaizen activities for increasing productivity.5 But he does not show the relationship between cost management
and kaizen activities. These two studies are surely complementary, if we find the way which organize kaizen
under the cost management.
Consequently, in contrast with the stereotyped opinion about kaizen at Japanese firms, there are two kinds of
kaizen activities at Toyota : kaizen made by the supervisory staff and engineers as their functions, and that
made by workers through the quality circles and suggestion system. The latter is well known in the Western
world as worker’s voluntary activities that bring high quality, while a essential part of economic gains realized
by kaizen cost reduction and productivity increase comes from the former with regards to the cost
management. This paper then aims to explain the conventions in the kaizen activities organized under the cost
management system at Toyota Motor Co., without neglecting of course the role of worker’s voluntary kaizen
activities.
However Toyota’s cost management met radical change at the beginning of 1990s after being essentially the
same for almost forty years. As Shimizu (1995a, b) shows, it was a matter of production efficiency management
related to labor cost. In the phase of the economic boom (the so−called bubble economy) during 1987−1991,
Toyota in addition to other Japanese carmakers encountered a labor crisis labor shortage and an aging work
force. The necessity to make the work attractive in order to employ a younger labor force including high school
graduated girls and to enable workers over forty years old to work on the assembly line led Toyota’s
management to modify and rationalize its production and human resources management. Concerning the
production efficiency management, unilateral control made by top management was altered for autonomous
control at the level of factories. The constraints imposed by rigid just−in−time principles of production were
loosened as a new−segmented assembly line saw the introduction of buffers. Ergonomics measures were often
systematically pursued. The wage system in which the weight of production allowance became so heavy (60%
of standard wage without overtime payment) was rationalized so as to be more equitable and comprehensible for
employees. Professional training was also systematized in order to give workers a deeper and wider
understanding of their work, and so on. All these measures taken by management turned towards a humanization
of work that evokes the Scandinavian system (see Sandberg, 1995) although Toyota pursued its own distinctive
path in this regard. However it follows at least that the “Lean Production” is not the promised land in the
twenty−first century contrary to the thesis of Wormack, Roos and Jones (1990) (see Freyssenet, Mair, Shimizu,
Volpato, 1998 ; Boyer, Charron, Jürgens, Tolliday, 1998 ; Durand, Stewart, Castillo, 1998). As a result, even if
５ After Nomura (1993) follows Mitsuo Ishida’s study (Ishida, Fujimura, Hisamoto and Matsumura, 1997, chapter 1), based on his
interviews with managers at T plant of Toyota.
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TPS always remains Toyota’s method to reduce cost, the way to bring this system about, has been radically
modified.
To show the importance of the change in Toyota’s cost and kaizen management, we have to start to look over
the relationship between cost management and kaizen activities, observed until the end of 1980s.
3. The Nature of Traditional Kaizen Activities
The TPS can be understood as a set of systematized ways to reduce the cost per vehicle. These cost reduction
activities start from the product design stage. After that, the management sets a reference cost of each of the
parts and a standard time for their production. Then the shop floors that produce these parts and vehicles firstly
endeavor to attain these costs and standard time, and then reduces them by carrying on kaizen activities. It is the
group leaders, chief leaders and engineers whose responsibility it is to execute these activities. These activities
and the kaizen gains are supervised and controlled by management. Thus we call these kaizen activities
“organized kaizen activities”. For this reason, it is important to understand the framework in which kaizen
activities are organized, and accordingly, we start with an explanation of Toyota’s cost management system
(Figure 1).
3. 1. Target Costing in the Design Stage
Toyota’s product design has been conducted by a product manager or a chief engineer (Shusa) who organizes
the design engineers who in turn belong to different Product Engineering Design Sections in his / her team in
order to realize his / her concept of a new or revised car. As is well known, this type of organization is called a
“matrix organization”. Moreover, it is also called “concurrent engineering” or “simultaneous engineering”
because first−tier suppliers, production engineers and Production Division already take part in this design phase.
Though the “matrix organization” has been replaced by four Product Development Centers regime at the
beginning of 1990s, and development term (lead time) has been shorten by using 3D−CAD and virtual
production system, no changes were observed in the target costing in the design stage. In addition, the emphasis
is on target costing more than ever for the reason we will see in the next section. Therefore, we have to have a
quick look at a “target costing” which then sets a “kaizen costing” for Production Divisions (see Figure 2 ; and
about the explanation in detail of “target costing”, see Monden, 1995 and Tanaka, 1993).
When a development of a new or revised vehicle is decided, its sales price and target (or desired) profit per
vehicle are fixed by the top management that takes into consideration the market price and new car’s features
that the Sales Division proposed based upon marketing and consumer analysis. As a result, the desired cost per
vehicle is given automatically. This cost is called the “target cost” , because it has to be attained firstly in the
product design phase and then in the production process where this model and its parts will be produced. After
setting the target cost, the target costing is launched under the control of Cost Management Council (or Target
Costing Council).
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In the design stage, begun after the product manager has fixed his / her product planning, the target costing is
organized so that the design engineers draw the parts and components of this vehicle so as to meet the target
cost, ensuring of course their required quality. Following Toyota conventions, the cycle of drawing parts and
production trials is repeated three times (but only one time from the end of the 1990s) before the definitive
designs that satisfy the target cost and quality criteria are fixed (this process is called “value engineering”). Each
time they draw the parts in this process, cost management personnel calculates the cost of the parts, in order to
verify whether or not the “target cost” is achieved. Then the cost realized by definitive drawing becomes the
referential cost of the product. Meanwhile, the Production Engineering Division, which conceives and prepares
the production lines of parts and the final assembly line subject to investment budget constraints, fixes the
“standard time” for producing parts and a whole vehicle. In other words, every production line has its own
referential cost and standard time per product.
3. 2. Cost Management in the Production Stage
The cost management in the production phase starts after mass production has begun. Firstly, these costs and
Figure 1. Cost Management System at Toyota
Source : Toyota
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standard times are not always met in production lines at least for the first few months, because workers are not
used to working in the new system, and also because new installations often break down. At Toyota, the
learning effects seem to appear almost three months after the launch of new production. If the referential cost is
not reached despite learning effects, then kaizen activities in order to reduce the cost or new drawings will be
tried. Secondly, when the target profit for each vehicle is not realized, efforts have to be devoted on the one
hand to increasing sales and on the other to cost reduction. In these two cases, kaizen activities for cost reduction
are imperative. But, even when referential cost and “standard time” are satisfied, the kaizen activities are
pursued in factories not only for keeping the referential cost and “standard time” but also for reducing them
further. Here exists an original feature of Toyota’s cost management. Although this management was altered at
the beginning of 1990s (see the next section), we explain here, in this section, the cost management that existed
until the end of the 1980s.
At Toyota, the costs to be managed in the Production Divisions consist of materials (including purchased
parts, tools and energy) costs and labor cost, which were controlled in a different way.
The former was supervised by the Cost Council organized at every hierarchical level in the company, i. e.
from top management to the shop floor (working group managed as the smallest unit) passing through
Figure 2 : Procedure of Target Costing
Source : Toyota
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Production Division, section levels (Ka), sub−section levels. The top management fixed the sum to reduce by
kaizen (the kaizen costing) following its profit strategy, then distributed it as a kaizen norm to all Production
Divisions taking into consideration their feasibility. In a Production Division, the allocated sum was shared out
among work groups passing through sections and sub−sections. The responsibility of this kaizen belonged to the
director of the Production Division, but a Cost Council was held every month and at every hierarchical level in
order to manage kaizen results as well as to discuss the various measures that might have to be taken.
By contrast with the management of materials costs, that of labor cost was very complex until the end of
1980s. Firstly, it was not this cost but production efficiency that had been managed, given the fact that the labor
cost was calculated on the basis of production efficiency. Secondly, it was only the Production Allowance
Council organized in the top management that was watching over and controlled the movement of production
efficiency. Thirdly, the management of this latter was related to the production allowance that constituted an
important part of the monthly standard wage of workers (almost 60% at the end of 1980s). Therefore, we have
to explain this production efficiency management taking notice of the fact that it was kaizen activities organized
by this management that brought Toyota a high performance in cost and quality competitiveness.
3. 3. Production Efficiency Management and Production Reward
In its simplified formula, the production efficiency means the inverse of the ratio of the real working hours
necessary to produce the products within their standard time :
Production Efficiency =
Σ (Standard Time) × (Production Volume)
Real Working Hours of Working Group
This efficiency was calculated per each working group and every month. Here, the production volume
contained only the products without defect. When products were defective and necessitated repairs, their
production efficiency fell in part for the sake of a decrease of production volume in a given time, and in part
because the real working hours became long for a given production volume. Therefore, the workers had to
assure the quality of products in their operations in order to keep or increase the production efficiency.
Prolongation of real working hours happened always also as workers stopped their production line when they
had problems in their operations such as existence of defective parts or when their operations were delayed with
respect to cycle time allocated time for executing a series of elementary operations. When defective parts
were found, the problem was notified to their supplier whose engineers were then asked to verify and solve the
problem. When the production line stopped for other reasons, it forced supervisory staff to revise standard tasks
after verifying whether this delay had arisen from an inadequate organization of tasks. In this case, kaizen
activities would be launched for improving the working process in question or the organization of tasks of a
whole production line. In fact, the line stop system was conceived by Taiichi Ohno so as to improve the
production line in precisely this way. This system served and serves still as a means to look for bottlenecks in
the production line. By dissolving them, production efficiency can be increased. Of course, supervisory staff
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always pursues these kaizen activities.
Moreover, the Production Allowance Council and the Production Management Division, which was in charge
of the production efficiency, were supervising the movement of production efficiency of all working groups.
The Figure 3 shows the actual system for the evaluation of production efficiency, but it is not far from the
system we are assessing here.
Toyota’s wage formula for all employees until the beginning of the 1990s is given as below if we neglect
various parts such as family allowance :
Monthly wage = BW (1 + PAC) (1 + OPC)
Where BW is the basic wage of each worker, PAC represents the production allowance coefficient for a
working unit (sub−section), and OPC the overtime payment coefficient. Although the PAC was determined in a
very complex way, we examine here only that pertaining to blue−collar workers in Production Divisions (the
detail of Toyota’s wage system in this epoch is explained by Nomura, 1993).
After adjusting the PE (production efficiency) in order to round off its fluctuations from month to month, this
adjusted PE of all working units was ranked and classified into four levels A, B, C and D from top to bottom.
Then the PAC was calculated as the average of the PEs within each level. If a working unit was classified at a
Figure 3 : Toyota’s System of Production Efficiency Evaluation
Source : Toyota
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higher level, its workers received a higher production allowance equal to their BW multiplied by PAC. It means
then that the gains obtained by productivity increase were shared between the company and the employees.
There was, however, a rule for cutting the standard times of the working units that marked the adjusted PE
higher than the average PE of the best level A. Their standard time was reduced so that their PE would achieve
this average PE. This was called the “standard time cutting rule”. Our story does not end here. At the same time,
management ordered the working units in question to reduce workers. If they did nothing in order to increase
their production efficiency, they would be classified in an inferior level in the next month. Because of this
convention, they were compelled to make kaizen in order to improve their production efficiency so as to reach at
least the same production efficiency as before with a reduced number of workers. In any case, it was difficult for
a working unit to always remain in the top level. Once classified in the top level, its rank fell to an inferior level
due to the standard time cutting rule, so that this working group was going to carry out kaizen activities so as to
be classified once more in the top level after several months or years. Thus, a kaizen−production efficiency−
production allowance chain was established (Figure 4). As all working units were doing the same thing, their
average PE had a tendency to increase (Figure 5). This gave in turn the augmentation of PAC as time passed.
In addition, by fixing an objective for increasing production efficiency every six months, the Production
Allowance Council occasionally ordered the working units whose production efficiency always remained low to
make kaizen. Alternatively, it imposed a kaizen norm on all working units when the company faced a difficulty
such as the period of the first oil crisis in 1974 or that of the fast appreciation of yen in 1985−87. Thus, the
increase of production efficiency by kaizen constituted the core of the TPS. However, this production efficiency
management has been altered for the sake of a labor crisis at the end of 1980s (see the next section).
3. 4. Kaizen organized
As we saw above, kaizen for increasing production efficiency, thus for lowering labor cost never was and is
the matter of worker’s voluntary activities. It was controlled under Kaizen Costing Management and Production
Efficiency Management. About this kind of kaizen, there was and is a division of labor amongst group leaders,
Figure 4. The relationship between Kaizen, PE and PR
Source : Shimizu, 1995a
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chief leaders (sub−section leader, or working unit leader), and engineers, although shop managers (section
chiefs) in a plant are promoters and coordinate the activities made by them (see Table 1 for the grade system at
Toyota).
− The group leaders are mainly in charge of reducing the cycle time of their workers by improving their
operation process. It of course contributes to the contraction of the real working hours of their group, and after
all to shortening the standard times. In fact, establishment of standard work and standard time is their main
function. In order to do this kaizen, the line stop system is useful for sorting out problems to solve, but also
they often form an autonomous study group in which they discuss problems and the various measures
necessary to solve them.
− The chief leaders engage themselves too in shortening the standard times of their working unit, but this
occurs by means of process improvements for reducing the workers in their unit. In general, the reduction of
workers from production line, called “Shôjinka” at Toyota (see Ohno, 1988, and Monden, 1985), constitutes
an important method at Toyota for increasing production efficiency as well as for decreasing labor costs.
They also take charge of the real working hours reduction by process improvements over several working
units. For this purpose, they also organize occasionally an autonomous study group including often their
supervisory staff.
− The engineers belonging to a plant are in charge of maintaining and improving the quality of products,
productivity, cost and security of work from an engineering view point. In general, capital−labor substitution
constitutes the main way of reducing workers. An installation of new equipment is made during the
reconstruction of production and assembly lines at the time of launching a revised vehicle. In this case, they
Figure 5. Movement of Average Production Allowance Coefficient
Source : Shimizu, 1999a
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play the role of intermediaries between shop floor and the Production Engineering Division, which is
ultimately responsible for implementing change. Also, as their usual activities, they conceive a mechanical
solution for the bottlenecks in production lines, discussing problems with group leaders and chief leaders,
which they cannot solve with their ordinary methods as we saw above. At Toyota, however, the replacement
of workers by machines has to be done after improving the operation process for the sake of rigidity of
machines as well as under the budget constraint.
Besides these main actors involved in kaizen, a maintenance team contributes to increasing the reliability of
equipment mainly by executing preventive maintenance and equipment kaizen. This of course contributes to
contracting real working hours by reducing line stops caused by machine breakdown. A kaizen group makes
tools and machines as required by the shop floor. Searching for bottlenecks and measures to take is not their
task. In assembly factories there exists also a “try−team” consisted of skilled workers of group leader level and
team leader level (the position of team leader was done away with around 1997). The main task of this team is in
verifying facility of and measuring time necessary for installing parts in a car body by “trying production” of a
new or revised car before launching its mass production. However, the “try−team” in some assembly factories is
doing kaizen activities of assembly line in close cooperation with engineers belonging to their factory.
As we saw above, it is mainly the group leaders, chief leaders and engineers who are carrying out kaizen
Table 1 : Grade System and Job Title at Toyota
Job Title (A&E) Grade Rank Job Title (Production)
Project
Position
Managerial
Position
Administrative &
Engineering Staff
Production Staff
Managerial
Position
Expert
Position
Project
General
Manager
Divisional
General Manager
Senior GeneralManager AA
Senior Grade 1 1A
Department G. M. Senior Grade 2 1B Deputy G. M. Project G. M.
Project Manager Senior Grade 3 20 Manager Project M.
Assistant Manager Staff Leader Assistant Manager CX 30 Chief Leader Chief Expert
[40] − 40
[50] SX 50 Group Leader Senior Expert
[60] EX1 60 − Expert
[7A] EX2 7A (Team Leader)
Staff [7B] 7B
[80] 80
[9A] 9A Team Members
[9B] 9B
[9C] 9C
Source : Toyota
Note: The grade system of Toyota changed during the 1990s. As far as our discussion is concerned, we should take note of the fact that
“team leader” as a job title was eliminated around 1997, and replaced by “Expert” who is not responsible for executing any
management function.
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activities concerning the production efficiency, the quality of products and the working security as their ordinary
function. These kaizen activities were under the production efficiency and cost management until the end of
1980s. In this sense, we can call it “organized kaizen activities”.
How about worker’s voluntary kaizen activities, then? Occasionally, some workers suggest an important and
remarkable idea about quality improvements or working process improvements. In general, however, and from
the viewpoint of management, their activities themselves have their own meaning other than the improvement of
production efficiency and the reduction of production costs. Thinking about their working place and
environment and the quality of their products is itself important. It serves as a training of their kaizen mind and
ability, that is, looking for problems in their work place, searching measures to take and solving problems. In the
case of quality circles, a worker becomes its leader in rotation and discusses with the other members about the
problem he / she or they set. It forms his / her communication capacity and leadership as well as their
cooperation mind. The importance is given here to forming their “kaizen mind” and “teamwork” (in Toyota’s
sense, it means cooperation among company’s members). These voluntary activities also allow workers to give
attention in their operations to product quality, productivity, costs and security. By carrying out kaizen activities
through quality circles or the suggestion system even if they can not realize an important kaizen from economic
viewpoint, workers are eventually able to obtain the abilities required for becoming supervisory staff, given the
fact that supervisory staff is selected from workers. For these reasons, the emphasis is on the activities
themselves.
After all, it was organized kaizen under control of production efficiency management and cost management
that constituted the source of Toyota’s high performance for more than thirty years. Especially we have to
remember the fact that the reduction of standard time and workers by organized kaizen was at the center of the
TPS for reducing cost and increasing productivity. However, it was this management that was called into
question around 1990.
4. Modifying Traditional Kaizen Management
During the “bubble economy” in 1987−91, demand for cars was overheated, accelerating the diversification
of car models including different model variations with high quality. All carmakers then augmented their sales.
Their profit, however, did not increase as rapidly as their sales, while some of them constructed a new assembly
plant in order to respond to the increasing demand. Despite the economic boom, these strategies became a
burden on their profitability. Furthermore, the “bubble economy” provoked a crisis of work, that is, labor force
shortage, because being able easily to get a high wage job, new labor market entrants, who have a tendency to
decrease due to a declining birth rate, avoided heavy manufacturing work. So, carmakers began to improve
assembly lines with a slogan “human friendly assembly line” or to install “silver lines” where aged workers
could work. Some of them also pushed automation when they constructed new plants (Kyushu plant for Nissan,
Hofu Plant for Mazda, Tahara No.4 plant for Toyota). At the same time, Toyota was engaged in a radical
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revision of its production management and human resources management in order to solve this labor crisis.
Taking the labor shortage for a long term phenomenon, Toyota also decided to change working conditions so
that high school graduated female workers and aged workers over forty years old might be willing to work there.
4. 1. Crisis of Work and the Necessity to Make Work More Attractive
Facing the labor crisis, in 1990 Toyota’s union and management formed a Committee in which their
representatives called into question the production efficiency management coupled with production allowance,
the human resources management, the working conditions and the tough assembly line work (see Shimizu, 1995
a, 1998, 1999a). Convinced of the necessity of making work more attractive for solving the labor crisis, Toyota
then decided to radically modify its production system.
The reason for this revision resided in the very characteristics of the TPS itself. As we explained, the way to
increase productivity or production efficiency was by reducing the number of workers by kaizening the
production process for a given production volume under the constraints of “just−in−time” production. Without
saying that it intensified work, the factories had a tendency to run with a minimum number of workers. In stable
economic growth, this system was running very well, but it could not meet the explosive demand of the “bubble
economy”. With diversification of parts and increased production volume, workers were heavily loaded so that
many young workers left Toyota. For example, one quarter of newly hired young workers left Toyota during
their first year in 1990. For solving the labor shortage thus provoked, Toyota employed a huge number of
temporary workers (their ratio in the direct workers reached more than 10%) mainly assigned to assembly plants
that consisted of, in general, a stamping shop, a welding shop, a paint shop and a assembly shop. In some
working groups, they occupied three quarters of workers. With a lack of normal trained workers and with
increased temporary workers who had not sufficient ability to execute complex tasks on Toyota’s assembly lines
on which various car models with diversified parts were assembled, the production line was often interrupted.
Group leaders and chief leaders then had to intervene on the line in order to solve problems. As a result, annual
working hours were prolonged (2, 315 hours in 1990) although productivity fell remarkably (see Figure 6). Even
the group leaders and chief leaders were exhausted, and the labor shortage turned out to be a crisis of collective
working as a human factor in the TPS.
In such a confusion, traditional production efficiency management as well as the rigid application of just−in−
time production, which means one by one production without buffers in its ideal model following Taiichi Ohno,
was put into question.
4. 2. New Production Efficiency Management and the Wage System
In the Committee, management promised the union not to push too much cost reduction by increasing the
production efficiency or reducing workers. Rather the promise was to make more effort for cutting the costs of
materials and parts in the product design stage much more than before. At the same time, management realized
the modification of production efficiency management.
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First of all, the management renounced its unilateral. The objective of production efficiency improvement
henceforth has not been imposed within the plants every semester by the top management (Production
Allowance Council). Now, plants themselves set their annual objective of production efficiency increase, while
the Production Allowance Council has been replaced by the Production Divisions Council (see Figure 3). In
general, it is a manager (section chief) who has to establish his / her section’s objective. Then the plant director
(administrator in general) arranges the objectives coming from the sections he / she manages. The Production
Division Council that checks the objective presented by the plants occasionally modifies this, taking accounts of
company’s profit strategy. After the approval of the various objectives thus adjusted, these become a kaizen
norm of each plant in terms of production efficiency. Thus, the kaizen for increasing production efficiency has
become autonomous. However, there is a problem : which criterion can the plant refer to, in order to establish
its own objective? In the case of a plant on which I have carried out observations, this objective was 3% for the
year 1996. This ratio represents the share of labor cost in the production cost.
Secondly, the method of determining the production efficiency was altered to become less constrained.
− It is now permitted to take into consideration the working segments where young female workers and older
workers are working, whereas the standard time had been determined by a “try−team”, then by skilled male
workers.
− The standard time had been fixed on the basis of the best standard time marked in the past, while it is now
fixed by measuring the time really required for worker’s operations three months after launching mass
production.
− Concerning actual working hours, management decided after negotiation with the union to reduce the long
annual working hours. After a planned reduction by 300 hours of annual working hours for three years from
Figure 6. Production, Productivity and Labor Force in the Period from 1985 to 1992
Source : Shimizu, 1999a
Note: Productivity represents that of direct workers including logistic workers in the plants (labor force). All indices were calculated on
the basis of Toyota’s data.
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1991 to 1993, a successive two shifts work without night shift (6 : 30−15 : 15 and 16 : 15−1 : 00) was set in
place in 1995, following after Toyota Kyushu (subsidiary of Toyota at Kyushu see Shimizu, 1995a). The
latter helped to reduce considerably long overtime work. Management and the union also encouraged employees
to consume all paid holidays, while they had discouraged them to do so in order to keep the attendance rate
high.
Thirdly, the method of calculating the production allowance, now called “productivity allowance”, was
altered for blue−collar workers and simply abolished for white−collar workers. After a minor change in wage
system in 1990, which introduced a grade allowance (GA, 10% of standard wage) and an age allowance (AA,
10%) by reducing the share of production allowance from 60% to 40%, Toyota radically changed its wage
system in 1993. It now has two systems, one for blue−collar workers and one for white−collar workers (their
AA was abolished in 1999) :
For blue−collar workers,
Standard wage = BW (40%) + GA (20%) + AA (20%) + PA (20%) ;
And for white−collar workers,
Standard wage = BW (40%) + GA (40%) + AA (20%).
The reason for which the production allowance had been paid to white−collar workers is that by doing so,
Taiichi Ohno wanted to manage their overtime, because the latter had the effect of lowering the production
efficiency of the company as a whole and then to augment the total labor cost. The union could not criticize this
system under the authority of Ohnoism, although white−collar workers felt it was strange. On the contrary, the
productivity allowance continues to be paid to blue−collar workers. This is because the union itself recognizes it
as a remuneration of workers’ efforts to increase productivity (production efficiency). As we mentioned before,
the production allowance can be interpreted as a share of profits realized through kaizen.
However the calculation of productivity allowance was changed so as to be reasonable and equitable.
− Production efficiency is determined in respect of the activities of all workers in the working sections that
include direct workers, workers of kaizen groups and those of maintenance teams. Previously, only direct
workers had been considered in this category. It is because all these workers contribute to increasing
productivity.
− The production efficiencies are classified by a group of homogeneous factories : a group for foundries,
forges, stamping and sheet metal shops, a group for mechanical components, a group for body welding, painting
and plastic molding, and an assembly group. It is because there is a difference in mechanization level among
theses groups, which affects the production efficiency. Within a group, the production efficiency of all sections
are classified into three levels A, B, C from top to bottom, in order to determine their production allowance
coefficient as mentioned before (see section 1.3).
− Productivity allowance coefficient is however applied to the sum fixed for each worker’s grade (hierarchical
rank), and not to the individualized basic wage as in the past. All workers of the same grade in the section now
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receive the same amount of productivity allowance. It has thus become clearly an allowance given as a
remuneration of the result of collective production.
− Although the share of productivity allowance in the standard wage was reduced from 40% to 20%, the
width of its variations was retained. Then, the character of production allowance as a shared profit realized by
kaizen and workers efforts has been kept in this new system.
After all, this change in the production efficiency management coupled with the wage systems, undertaken
during in the first half of 1990s, is remarkable in itself when we note the fact that the production efficiency
management remained untouchable for the union from the beginning of 1950s until 1990. In fact, the
management gives the plants an autonomy in kaizen activities even for increasing productivity, and surely this
gives them more responsibility for cost management. Thus, the framework of cost management remains
unchanged, but the way to bring into play this management has been fundamentally altered. It also means that
giving a high motivation to employees is indispensable so that this kind of management is fruitful.
4. 3. Kaizen for Making Assembly Work More Attractive
With the cost management, the way to work on the assembly line was revised in order to get down the high
turnover rate, and also so that young female workers and aged workers, who had been transferred to an indirect
section, are willing to work there. On the basis of discussions held in the Committee and also in the Assembly
Directors Council, the Production Engineering Division developed a new concept of assembly line and work
organization. After trying an automatization of assembly line when the Tahara No.4 plant was constructed, this
new concept was realized in the Toyota Kyushu’s assembly line (cf., Shimizu, 1995a, b ; Ogasawara and Ueda,
1997 ; Nohara, 1998).
− An assembly line is divided into about ten segments per function (eleven in the case of Toyota Kyushu). It
is permitted to have a buffer between two segments, the buffer corresponding to five minutes operations. Thus,
when a segment is stopped because of a problem, the others continue to work. So, the production efficiency of
the assembly line as a whole does not get lower, and the line stop system does not oblige the workers to work as
much overtime as in the past, because the loss of time provoked by stopping a segment can be absorbed by the
buffer. This means loosening the just−in−time rule under which having any buffer in the production line had
been regarded as sin. The stress workers had been feeling when they stopped the line was relaxed. So, it became
easy for workers to assure quality in their working place.
− Moreover, a working group is operating in a segment where its group leader has a greater power on his /
her work organization than before. Then, the group leader is allowed to stop the segment during the time their
buffer permits in order to examine a problem to solve (this is called “planned stop”), whereas the right to this
kind of line stop belonged only to the manager (section chief). In this way, working groups have now a certain
degree of autonomy on their organization of work. For example, at Toyota Kyushu, a group can hold a meeting
during working hours in order to do kaizen activities so far as this meeting does not disturb the others, i.e. so far
as the buffer allows. Each segment also has a quality checking post so that not only a worker but also a working
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group as a whole can assure quality.
− For making the work less loaded, an ergonomic method developed by the Production Engineering Division
(TVAL Toyota Verification of Assembly Line) is applied to measure the load of all operations. All
operations, of which TVAL value is higher than a certain level, are considered as too heavy operations, and then
dissolved. This method gives Toyota’s Criteria on Hygiene and Security following which the production process
is now being improved. On the basis of this method, many ergonomic means have been taken in order to make
assembly work so easier that even young female workers and aged workers may work there. For example, a
large conveyer installed on the ground level permit workers to operate, standing on it and without walking much
with a car body moving, and especially without walking backward. Tasks to carry heavy parts also disappeared
by installing automatic or semi−automatic equipment, though automatization was not pursued because of its
rigidity.
This assembly line concept was realized when reconstructing old assembly lines. After Toyota Kyushu, it was
applied to Motomachi No.2 plant (1994 closed in 2003), Tahara No.1 plant (1995), and Motomachi No.1
plant (1996) in Japan and to new Kentucky No.2 plant (1994) in USA. These reconstructed assembly lines are
not the same as that at Toyota Kyushu because of difference in their factory space and of budget constraints
(Japan has been in the long depression from 1991). It has to be remembered that Toyota is now giving an
importance to improving assembly work or to “humanizing” assembly work. This means also that the work in
the past, at least until the end of 1980s, was so heavy that new generations of workers were unable to sustain it
even with higher wages. Of course, the female workers and aged workers were regarded as being unable to work
there. So, we can say the labor shortage led Toyota to radically revise its factory management. As a result,
kaizen toward humanized work is now systematically pursued. This new orientation of kaizen activities, going
with the modification of production efficiency management, provoked a remarkable repercussion, as we see
below.
5. A Case Study of New Kaizen Activities at Tahara No. 1 Plant
As we mentioned above, the assembly line at Tahara No.1 plant was reorganized in 1995 clearly following
the new concept realized first at Toyota Kyushu. However it was the assembly section itself that conceived this
new assembly line, taking the initiative in product design and reconstruction of the assembly line.
It began in 1991 where the revision in 1995 of the Hilux Surf (sports utility) being assembled and the
assembly of another sports utility (Land Cruiser Prado) from 1996 were planned. On the basis of discussions
held in the Committee above mentioned, the director of this assembly plant suggested to his assembly section’s
manager (section chief) to prepare the revision of this sports utility by searching for an “ideal assembly line”. He
then started to conceive it and organize engineers, “try−team” staff, chief leaders and group leaders so that
everyone would collaborate in order to realize an ideal assembly line about which he did not however have any
clear conception. Then he fixed the orientation toward the reconstruction of his assembly line as follows :
Koichi Shimizu２７２
－１８－
− Construct an assembly shop where the workers can work easily and execute their operations
“rhythmically” ;
− Organize a human centered Toyota Production System ;
− Form a kaizen mind of everyone so that he / she willingly does kaizen.
The section chief thought that if the assembly shop were organized in such a way, it would also contribute to
increase production efficiency assuring quality and security, and then to reduce costs. There were many
problems to solve, which necessitated the collaboration of the product manager of these models, Product
Engineering Design Sections, Production Engineering Division as well as those of Araco (assembler of Land
Cruiser) and Hino (assembler of Hilux Surf). Araco designed the body of Land Cruiser Prado ; Hino, that of
Hilux Surf whereas Toyota developed their chassis. In fact, the conception of new assembly line could not be
developed without modifying vehicle structures and parts designs of these models.
5. 1. Organizing a “Teamwork” amongst Group Leaders, Chief Leaders and Engineers
First of all, the section chief had to convince the engineers belonging to this plant, chief leaders and group
leaders as they would construct by themselves their own assembly line in collaboration amongst them.
First, he persuaded the engineers who in turn persuaded the members of the “try−team” which consisted of
supervisor level employees (group leaders and team leaders). It was these people who verified two vehicle
structures and their parts in order to make proposals for modifying parts designs and the vehicle structures to
product managers, Product Engineering Design Sections, Araco and Hino. They also examined the whole
assembly line and made clear all problems to solve following the criteria given by their section chief.
Then, he discussed with all chief leaders one by one in order to persuade them of his idea, because they had to
be main actors in the kaizen of working process. After convincing them, he organized their meeting for learning
the way of thinking about just−in−time, “Jidôka”, reduction of workers by kaizen, standard task and standard
time, Kanban system, logistics, kaizen of working process, calculation of production efficiency and of
productivity allowance, method of kaizen and so called “operation in the fixed−zone” which means that a
worker finishes a series of elementary operations within a given working zone. This meeting was held every
month for six hours as a whole, having a monthly subject to discuss. The same meeting was organized for the
group leaders and for team leaders. In these meetings, the emphasis was on forming their attitude and way of
thinking that the section chief demanded. Holding these meetings, he succeeded in motivating them to construct
their own assembly line or to make kaizen for this purpose.
Along with these meetings, an autonomous study group was organized respectively by chief leaders as well as
by group leaders. The chief leaders group was carrying on kaizen of production processes over several working
groups in order to eliminate a worker from a shift for example or to realize “operation in the fixed−zones”, etc.,
while “group leaders” group was engaged in improving workers tasks or working processes taking up one of the
posts in their working group every month. All these activities were discussed in the groups so that they would
share the know−how and problems.
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Thus, good cooperative relations amongst engineers, chief leaders and group leaders were set into place in
this assembly plant. This “teamwork”, of which an engineer is “proud” in comparison with other plants, enabled
them to carry out the construction of the new assembly line, and to make kaizen toward humanized work even
after the launching mass production.
5. 2. Value Engineering Suggestions
In order to construct an ideal assembly line, the difference in assembly time of Hilux Surf and Land Cruiser
Prado had to be dissolved. The fact that this difference was almost one hundred minutes (258 minutes for Hilux
Surf against 356 minutes for Land Cruiser Prado) made it impossible to assemble them on the same line.
Accordingly, the assembly section decided to make proposals for modifying the structures of these vehicles so
that they could have similar structures, as well as of using the same parts as much as possible. In order to do this
these propositions had to be accepted by the product managers of these models and also by Product Engineering
Design Sections, Araco and Hino at the very beginning of product design phase. That was in 1992.
After analyzing old models and comparing their structures and parts, this plant presented VE suggestions
(value engineering suggestions) over two hundred points to Product Engineering Design Sections, and after all,
about one hundred−fifty suggestions were accepted and realized by the latter. As a result, the difference in
assembly time of the two vehicles has dissipated : now the assembly time is 259 minutes for Hilux Surf and 254
minutes for Land Cruiser Prado.
The participation of the assembly section in product design process at such an early stage and the VE
suggestions made are themselves very exceptional and amazing. In general, Production Division concerns itself
with the product design process when trying to assemble a new designed car begins in order to verify the facility
of its assembly and the quality of new parts. In this case, the Production Division is used to demand
modification of parts design to Product Engineering Design Sections. However VE suggestions were never
proposed before the first design was drawn.
It then shows the high technical level of supervisor level workers of the “try−team” (team leaders and group
leaders) as well as that of engineers belonging to the plant. The former can receive technical training in
collaboration with engineers, i.e. on the job training. Every supervisor experiences a “try−team” in rotation so
that their technical level gets higher.
After Tahara No.1 plant’s experience, this new direction of plant’s participation in product development
begins to diffuse through the other plants. As a consequence, Toyota’s concurrent engineering are modified so
that such a plant’s participation contributes to shorten the product development term by making clear the
problems of old vehicles at the very beginning of product development.
5. 3. Constructing an Ideal Assembly Line
The reconstruction of the assembly line began already in 1991 under budget constraints and without
production stoppages.
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The annual budget of a plant is managed by the Production Council in the top management, whereas the
budget for reconstruction of assembly line at the time of vehicle revision, more important than the former, is
decided by the Cost Council. Though Tahara No.1 plant planned the reconstruction over four years, it could not
receive a sufficient annual budget for this operation. By using the manager’s budget, usually spent for making
human relations activities, besides its normal annual budget, by receiving a financial help from the other plants
at Tahara, and by making money by carrying out kaizen for reducing cost (which gives the plant an increase of
manager’s budget), this plant realized the reorganization of assembly line with almost 70% of planned budgets
in four years (5 billion yens). This means that the assembly section could not make luxury investments to realize
an “ideal assembly line” as in Toyota Kyushu plant, but tried to do it in an economic way.
Under such budgetary constraints, two existing assembly lines had to be reorganized into only one assembly
line divided into ten segments. The emphasis was laid on the humanization of work according to the orientations
initially set by the section chief. That is, the assembly line has to be
− Without any operation difficult to execute,
− Easy to assure the quality,
− Assuring worker’s security,
− With efficient logistic,
− Able to assemble a vehicle in a time as short as possible,
− Assembling a vehicle with low cost,
− Having high investment returns.
For this purpose, the first thing the section chief wanted was to optimize the height of car body in order that
workers could execute their operations without taking a difficult and hard physical posture. To decide the
optimal height of assembly line, variable depending on working posts, engineers examined all tasks. Making
work three workers of different height a tall worker (176cm), an average worker (170cm) and a small
worker (162cm) at each post so that they could work taking their best posture, the engineers determined the
best height of vehicle body in each working post. On the basis of these criteria, adjustment of the assembly line
height began in 1992.
These heights were not realized exactly, because it was necessary to level them off in order to constructing the
assembly line. Consequently, particular measures were taken so that each worker could take a best working
posture. At the end of 1992, 85% of working posts were then already adjusted by construction work, made in
weekend by subcontractors, and the rest was done at the time of the ordinary reconstruction of assembly line for
launching a revised vehicle in 1995.
Secondly, the “try−team” conducted by engineers examined every task in order to verify whether it
corresponded with the criteria proposed by the section chief. About the tasks that had problems, they classified
these tasks in three groups :
− The group where problems had to be solved by modification of parts design, so that they presented VE
suggestions to Production Engineering Design Sections as we saw above ;
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− The group where problems could be dissipated by installation of equipment and which would be realized by
using the annual budget or the budget for vehicle revision ;
− The group where problems could be solved by improving working processes and / or equipment.
From 1992 until August 1994, the chief leaders and group leaders carried out kaizen to improve working
processes, whereas a kaizen team took care of improvements to existing equipment and also of the realization of
some of the installations. A large part of the new equipment was subcontracted to machine makers internally and
externally. From September 1994, mainly the chief leaders in collaboration with engineers prepared the way for
the reorganization of two assembly lines into one line, and this work started in May 1995 and was completed in
November 1995.
Along with the activities of chief leaders and group leaders, maintenance teams were improving the reliability
of equipment in collaboration with engineers, while a logistic team ameliorated the logistic system in the plant
in order to assure security, for example by eliminating forklifts from the shop floors, as well as to increase
efficiency in the parts supply.
Although our explanation of the construction of assembly line at Tahara No.1 plant is not exhaustive, it
follows at least that kaizen is not only dedicated to the cost reduction and especially to the increase of
production efficiency, but also to the elimination of hard works. Kaizen for improving productivity and reducing
labor costs is always pursued in all plants as we saw before, but at Tahara No.1 plant, this kind of kaizen has to
be made after achieving the kaizen for humanizing works. In fact, following the guideline engineers established
in order to improve working processes during the reconstruction of the assembly line, the former has to be made
after satisfying the latter because the priority of kaizen is focussed upon the humanization of work. As the
improvement of assembly line corresponding to the “ideal” did not terminate at the time of the reconstruction,
chief leaders and group leaders have continued to do kaizen after launching mass production of the revised
vehicles.
At this point, we have to make a remark. This experiment coincides completely with the discussions held in
the Committee for making the work more attractive. However, we have to say that as far as we know the case of
Tahara No.1 plant was unique even at Toyota. In fact, it was the Production Engineering Division that
conceived a new assembly line at Toyota Kyushu, Motomachi No.1 and No.2 plants. Also, kaizen activities in
other plans were not organized as systematically as at Tahara No.1 plant. However, others began to share this
experience, even if they cannot take the same initiative for constructing their assembly line as at Tahara No.1
plant6.
6. Conclusions
Toyota has been carrying out many other reorganizations from the beginning of 1990s, on office work and on
６ For example, Toyota’s oldest assembly plant at Motomachi began to train its plant engineers from 1998 as they can conceive its
assembly line by themselves about which its chief engineer is developing a new concept.
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Engineering Design Sections as well as on its product strategy, but changes made in its cost management and
kaizen activities are the most important from the viewpoint of labor relations as well as in order to understand
Toyota’s labor management. In fact :
− Vector of cost management was reoriented towards cost reduction made in the product design stage more
than in production stage ;
− The production efficiency management was altered from the unilateral one to an autonomous one of
Production Divisions ;
− This is occurring together with changes in wage systems as well as in the management of working hours.
These modifications mean that after encountering the labor crisis, Toyota can not search only for the cost
reduction by increasing production efficiency, but also has to advance humanization of work.
Thus, kaizen activities were reoriented for making assembly work more attractive. Here they do not refer to
workers voluntary activities, but organized ones as we explained, that is, kaizen on a large scale made by
engineers of the Production Engineering at the time of reconstruction of assembly line, and kaizen usually
carried out in the plant by engineers, chief leaders and group leaders. In reality, the essence of the Toyota
Production System resides here in the organized kaizen activities under production efficiency management. For
this reason, the change in cost management is meaningful and opened the door to further kaizen initiatives. We
can conclude it though by recognizing that an analysis which suggests the emergence of a new Toyotism
demands the study of all changes which took place during the 1990s (see Shimizu, 1999a).
The case of kaizen realized at Tahara No.1 plant is eloquent too. It shows a new possible concurrent
engineering where the Production Division takes part in the product design process at its very beginning. At
least, it confirms that today, car design and conception of assembly line have to go hand in hand in order to
facilitate and humanize assembly activities. This also means that an initiative taken by shop floor personnel can
play an important role in concurrent engineering.
Finally, it is the time to discuss, based upon what we saw above, the kaizen activities in Toyota’s transplants
in USA and Europe. The main reason for which Toyota is promoting kaizen made by quality circles and
individual workers through the suggestion system resides in the necessity for nourishing kaizen mind and ability
of workers as well as constructing good human relations on which the TPS is based. Their kaizen activities
imply four effects : paying attention to the quality and productivity, acquiring little by little kaizen and
problem−solving ability, perceiving the work place as their own, and understanding the meaning of kaizen. This
also says doing kaizen by themselves serves to elude a harmful “us and them” relationship at the shop floor,
caused by top−down process in kaizen, especially in the countries where antagonistic relations between workers
and supervisors are prevailing. Obviously, kaizen imposed provokes there workers’ hostile or negative reaction
against improvement of their own working process. So, it is the priority for the company to construct good
human relationship among them, which workers’ kaizen activities can be one of the means to involve them in. In
short, the difference in industrial relations and history of Toyota and its transplants led Toyota to choose such a
policy. As workers and supervisory staff accumulate their experiences, the transplants will probably set in place
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the same system as in Toyota’s home plants. Until then, the transplants might continue to receive the technical
support from their Japanese mother plant, especially in productivity improvement.
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Reorienting Kaizen Activities at Toyota :
Kaizen, Production Efficiency, and Humanization of Work
Koichi Shimizu
One of the widely held opinions about Japanese firms’ high performance suggests that Japanese employees,
organized in teams, are making kaizen (continuous improvements) in their own jobs through quality circles or
other initiatives such as a suggestion system. But who are these employees? They would have to be blue−collar
workers in the Western perception, but the part of their contribution in improving productivity and price cost
does not seem exceed 10% of all improvements obtained. Who then brings about the major part of these
improvements? Are the kaizen activities carried out without having relation to the company’s profit strategy? If
the employees have an objective in their kaizen activities, who provides the objectives? What do these
objectives consist of? How are their activities managed? These questions invite us to inquire about a whole
management system of kaizen at Toyota Production System, considered as the basic model of “Lean
Production”. But Toyota reoriented its organized kaizen activities toward the construction of more humanized
production system during 1990s. This paper then shows this reorientation and the new direction by showing the
case of Tahara No.1 plant. Through these discussions, I want to emphasize the importance of organized kaizen
activities that group leaders, chief leaders and engineers are carrying out, and also the fact that their activities are
now centered not only upon productivity increase but also upon the humanization of work.
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